This paper analyzes the transactions that led to the partial privatization of China's three largest banks in 2005-06. It suggests that these transactions were structured to allow for inter-organizational learning under conditions of uncertainty. For the involved foreign investors, participation in large financial intermediaries of central importance to the Chinese economy gave them the opportunity to learn about financial governance in China. For the Chinese banks partnering with more than one foreign investor, their participation allowed them to benefit from the input by different players in the global financial market place and to learn from the range of technical and governance expertise offered. This model of bank reform contrasts with the privatization strategies pursued in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe throughout the 1990s. These different experiences stand for alternative strategies of bank reform-One that relies on top down changes of the rules of the game; another that focuses on inter-organizational learning via observation. It suggests that the latter model may be superior under conditions of uncertainty. The paper discusses the costs and benefits of these alternative models in the context of the global financial crisis.
I. Introduction
Banking and financial sector reforms have proved themselves to be challenging undertakings for domestic reformers and policy advisors around the world. Many reform attempts have gone astray as the chosen strategies failed to take into account existing institutions the newly privatized, merged, acquired, or re-capitalized banks would operate under. Eastern Europe and Latin America are replete of cases where banks had to be recapitalized more than once, 3 or where bank privatization gave rise to government bailouts or outright renationalization only to be followed by another round of privatization.
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Against this background, China's approach to banking reform stands out as unique among emerging markets with a recent history of financial sector reform. Rather than privatizing banks and transferring control to foreign investors-the dominant strategy in Eastern Europe and most of Latin America-China sold minority stakes in its largest banks to a group of selected foreign strategic investors. 5 In each case at least two foreign investors with different business profiles acquired substantial minority stakes prior to the public offering and typically committed to buy additional shares in the public sale. The government retained control and the remaining shares ended up in the hands of a range of investors-including other publicly controlled entities, as well as individual investors. Foreign financial intermediaries were sought as strategic partners for helping to transform China's banks and making them competitive both at home and abroad; this task became all the more urgent as China had committed to open its financial service sector by the end of 2006. 6 This paper analyzes how these transactions contributed to the reform of China's banking sector and facilitated the transformation of state-controlled bank behemoths used primarily to channel financial resources to targeted economy sectors into viable financial intermediaries capable of competing globally. It argues that the transactional model chosen facilitated inter-organizational learning that has translated into tangible results in at least two of the banks in question; the paper also notes that a series of transactions between sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) from China, Singapore, and the Middle East with Western banks since 2007 that have adopted notably similar transactional models.
The implications of these transactions call for a better understanding of alternative transactional models and their implications for institutional change.
The paper is organized as follows: Part II describes the transactions that were central to the partial privatization of China's three large banks in 2005-06 and contrasts this model with the privatization experience in Central and Eastern Europe; Part III develops two qualitative models of banking reform-one based on the transfer of control, the other based on learning by monitoring; Part IV applies the insights gained from these models to transactions between sovereign wealth funds (SWF) and Western banks during the global financial crisis; Part V concludes. 6 For a discussion of the challenges China faced under WTO requirements, see (Bonin and Huang 2001) II. China's Bank Deals vs. Privatization Strategies Like other socialist countries, China inherited a mono-bank system unsuited to the tasks of transforming a centrally planned economy into one based increasingly on market principles-even if under state guidance. 7 As in other countries, China began the transformation by breaking up the mono-bank and establishing several specialized banks:
The Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the Bank of China (BOC), and China Construction Bank (CCB); The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) was added in 1985. 8 Until the mid-1990s, China's "Four Big Banks" operated under direct guidance and control of the central government; their roles can be better describes as resource allocators than financial intermediaries. Beginning in the mid-1990s, however, China's banks were pushed towards intermediation; they were instructed to operate as commercial banks and become accountable for profits and losses they incurred. 9 These measures encouraged the banks to explore new market segments, including consumer credit and lending to the non-state sector. However, they remained heavily exposed to the state-owned enterprise sector, and as a result were saddled with substantial amounts of non-performing loans (NPLs). Estimates on the ratio of NPL vary with different sources putting it at between twenty-seven and forty-four percent in the year 2001. 10 China sought to tackle the NPL problem by creating several asset management companies 7 See (Nanto and Sinha 2002) for a summary of China's banking reforms. 8 Note that a fifth bank, China Bank of Communication also received substantial foreign investment in 2005. HSBC acquired a 19.9 percent stake in the bank at the time. 9 Another way of putting this is to say that the budget constraint of these banks was hardened. See (Kornai, Maskin, and Gerard 2003) for an overview of the soft budget constraint syndrome and (Berglof and Gerard 1998) for its application to the transition context. 10 See Nanto and Sinha (2002) knowledge and expertise in order to enhance returns on their investment. Second, the foreign minority investors agreed to lockup periods typically of three years during which they could not sell their shares without consent of the company's management and/or the controlling owner-in other words, foreign investors were asked to tie themselves to these investments for a limited period. Third, foreign banks were given an option to increase their stake to a maximum of 19.9 percent after the lock-in period had expired, allowing them to reap the benefits of their investments at a future date. Finally, investors holding shares beyond a critical threshold (i.e. 2.5 percent) were given the option of nominating directors to the board of directors of the bank they had invested in. Haas and Van Lelyveld 2008) the banks in question and on their role in the domestic, as well as the global financial market place. While China's banks have not been immune to the crisis-and indeedsome foreign banks have already sold their stakes in China's banks-the decision to engage more than one strategic investor has limited their dependence on a single investor.
III. Banking Reform: Assessing Alternative Strategies
Financial sector reform is primarily about institutional change, i.e. the reshaping of sustained collective expectations of key actors in charge of decision-making inside banks, and also of regulators and other policy-makers from the outsiders; 24 yet, one of the unresolved puzzles of institutional development is how institutional learning takes place and how it might help a country to depart from existing institutional paths 25 that have failed to deliver economic growth and development; the subsequent section discusses two approaches and offers evidence on how they have faired in the context of financial sector reform: changing the rules top down, and inter-organizational learning by monitoring.
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Changing the Rules from the Top Down
One approach to institutional change is to change the rules of the game in a topdown fashion by transferring control rights to the new owners and by enacting new laws and regulations. Transferring ownership from state to private hands is said to alter the incentive structure by promoting more efficient use of assets. 27 Moreover, a new owner can bring much needed capital and expertise to a firm-or in this case-a bank. This was the underlying philosophy of privatization policies in Latin America and Eastern Europe in the 1990s which were aimed at promoting the restructuring of firms and transforming the economies in which they operate; 28 it is based on the assumption that a change in control will alter the modus operandi at the bank and that new owners will take decisions that will put a bank on a more efficient path. The model has dominated banking reforms in Eastern Europe as well as in Latin America-where privatization and transferring control to foreign banks became the primary policy strategy. As a result, foreign banks now dominate these markets.
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The strong presence of foreign banks has undoubtedely had a positive impact on the performance of individual banks, however, the impact on financial market development-in particular on the broadening and deepening of financial markets in these countries-is less certain. 30 Available evidence suggests that in transition economies their influence focused primarily on three market segments: foreign firms from their home jurisdictions, 31 consumer lending-especially mortgage lending, 32 and 27 This is the conclusion drawn by property rights theories. Whether this insight translates to more complex ownership relations in organizations has been questioned. See, for example, (Kornai 1990) 28 See (Cooter 1992) and (Worldbank 1996) . 29 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 30 A recent paper suggests that foreign bank presence positively affects growth in the real sector. However, the impact of foreign bank presence on financial market development depends on the relative level of development of the country in question. Foreign banks are less important in the presence of well established financial markets, but can help alleviate financial constraints in less developed ones. See (Bruno and Hauswald 2008) for details. The study concludes that foreign bank ownership is only one strategy for financial market development, and that efforts to foster domestic markets and appropriate institutional reforms are also important. Ibid at 21. 31 According to a survey conducted by Berger et al., foreign investors in Eastern Europe continue to prefer dealing with banks from their home jurisdictions when operating abroad, whereas they have switched to domestic banks in other markets. See (Berger et al. 2003) 32 See (Haselmann, Pistor, and Vig 2009) lending to the government. 33 In contrast, foreign banks appear to have been less important for lending to the enterprise sector, and to the extent they did, they focused largely on large companies.
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One of the many lessons of the privatization policies of the 1990s has been that privatization is not enough for transforming an economy; in addition to changing ownership, the institutions that underpin a market economy must be developed-a process that requires extensive legal and regulatory reforms. 35 The transfer of ownership was therefore complemented with an infusion of 'best practice' legislation and regulation from countries with a demonstrably successful economic track record. These efforts received a major boost with the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98; many observers attributed the crisis to defects in the institutions of the countries in question 36 -which in turn let the IMF to launch a major new initiative to develop a sound "international financial architecture." 37 Countries around the globe were assessed against a set of indicators for sound rules on corporate governance, bankruptcy, the regulation of securities as well as of financial intermediaries.
33 (De Haas, Ferreira, and Taci 2007) using survey data from 20 transition economies. (Haselmann, Pistor, and Vig 2008) confirm the finding for consumer lending, but don't find evidence on expansion of lending to governments. Note, however, that they examined lending behavior as a function of changes in the legal regime for creditor rights rather than overall lending patterns. 34 Note, however, that a recent study suggests that the presence of foreign banks in transition economies has enhanced the prospects of SMEs to obtain external credit. See (Giannetti and Ongena 2009 ). However, this may have been a temporary phenomenon attributable primarily to the easing of credit conditions that has accompanied the recent global credit boom. On the rapid expansion of credit in transition economies, see (Enoch 2007) . 35 For an early exposition of this point see (Pistor 1995) . The insight that law 'matters' has given rise to the law and finance literature initiated by (La Porta et al. 1998) . 36 See, for example, (Johnson et al. 2000) . Critical, however, (Radelet and Sachs 1998) 41 This would suggest that reliance on a singular best-practice model is an illfated strategy given that the sustainability of said model may not be known ex ante.
Moreover, the transference of standardized law and regulatory regimes cannot substitute for the development of governance mechanisms for financial markets that are adapted to local circumstances and thus sensitive and responsive to changes therein. Imported legal standards may only uneasily fit into pre-existing institutions; in fact, many complementary institutions that are easily available in the exporting country may be absent in the country that imports 'best practice' standards from abroad; 42 legal standards 38 See, for example, the self-critical review of the World Bank of its reform strategies throughout the 1990s (Worldbank 2005) . For a critical review, see (Rodrik 2006) 39 For a critical review of derivatives see (Partnoy and Skeel 2007) 40 (Summers 1997) 41 See Haselmann et al. and De Haas et al., supra note 28. 42 (Pistor 2002) need to be adapted over time to respond to changing circumstances. As has been argued elsewhere, 43 law is inherently incomplete in that it is. unable to anticipate all future events. Effective law therefore relies heavily on a proper allocation of lawmaking and law-enforcement powers and their use by local agents. This suggests that legal and regulatory reform can be only a partial solution to the problem of financial sector reform.
The key to developing successful reforms is to alter the collective expectations for conducting financial and economic relations. While property and legal reforms may signal that such a change is intended, the implementation of this formal, top-down change requires a buy-in by key actors in the market-within organizations, as well as via law enforcement agencies. Upon closer scrutiny, the top-down approach that was expected to shift economies to a new mode of economic organization turns out to be a rather indirect strategy to achieve institutional change, which ultimately depends on changing behavior on the ground-level.
Learning by Inter-Organizational Monitoring
An alternative approach to institutional change is to encourage institutional learning by actors in one economic system or organization from counterparts that may exist elsewhere. This approach rests on a very different understanding of the processes of institutional change than does the best-practice approach discussed above; it is actorbased, in the sense that it assumes that for institutional change to occur, actual change is required in the practices of individual actors. 44 This is based on the notion that behavioral change is more likely to be achieved by engaging individual actors in the process of 43 (Pistor and Xu 2003) 44 See (Greif 2006 ) for a behavioral account of institutions.
change rather than confronting them with new policy guidelines enshrined in formal lawin the development of which they did not take part. Finally, it requires learning not only on the part of the recipient of foreign capital and expertise, but also on the part of the providers of these inputs.
The transactional model for the China bank deals creates incentives for cooperation without sharing control: Foreign intermediaries were to transfer operational and business skills while receiving an opportunity to familiarize themselves with the operation of China's financial markets and governance regime. The lock-in period ensured that foreign investors would invest in this venture and not cash-in their capital gains when the first opportunity arose; the option to increase their stakes at a future point nonetheless allowed them to participate in the long-term returns of their investments.
Finally, the option to nominate non-executive directors-albeit falling short of giving minority investors a strong "voice" 45 -afforded them insights into the decision-making processes at China's state-controlled entities. This information is likely to have currency beyond the deals at hand, especially for banks with plans of future expansions either with or without government partners.
The task for policy-makers is also quite different in these two models: In the bestpractice model, their major task is to identify the most effective practices and to encourage the drafting and passage of legislation that reflects these models. In the learning-by-observation model, policy-makers set parameters for the transactions that instill a process of inter-organizational learning; if properly structured, monitoring and the lessons learned via these observations become integral parts of transaction 45 (Hirschman 1970) famously labeled the options of members in organizations as 'exit', 'voice' and 'loyalty'. development which also serve to deliver economic benefits-positive returns on investments. As Sabel has put it, "discrete transactions among independent actors become continual, joint, formulations of common ends in which the participants' identities are reciprocally defining." 46 China's approach to transforming the banking sector can be viewed as an attempt to structure deals in order to encourage transactional learning via monitoring. The channel through which learning by monitoring takes place is the collaboration on specific projects inside the bank as well as board representation.
Some of the foreign banks that acquired minority stakes in China's largest banks have been deeply involved in their restructuring process; based on available evidence this has been the case more so for BofA at CCB and RBS at BOC-and to a lesser extent for
Temasek at both CCB and BOC, than for others. This suggests that not every relation created by the initial transactions has produced more than financial returns for their investors, however, this data and its' implications are important information, relevant to the banks as well as for policy-makers as they select partners for future transactions.
The best source for the analysis of the nature and scope of collaboration that has taken place are the annual reports of the three banks-all of which are publicly available.
While they give an incomplete picture-not to mention one written with the goal of pleasing investors-they nonetheless contain important information. the 'voice' they confer as opposed to the insights they offer about governance practices at the company they invest in. Given the dominant role played by government-controlled entities as major shareholders of these banks, they are likely to offer foreign investors clues not only about organizational governance, but also about the objectives for the governance of financial markets pursued by the Chinese authorities.
In sum, the foreign strategic investors in China's three banks have been involved in developing areas of financial services in which they have a comparative advantage. shed doubts on the merits of that model itself. Moreover, foreign bank dominance has left many banks in Eastern Europe and Latin America exposed to the success and failure of 56 (Jin and Qian 1997) ; see also (Qian 2003) 57 (Qian, Roland, and Xu 2006) the banks' parents whose conduct and business strategies they could neither monitor nor influence (Pistor 2009 ).
To be sure, the China-bank deals were also affected by the crisis. Several Western banks sold part or all of the shares they had acquired in Chinese banks upon the expiration of the lockup periods they had initially agreed to. This occurred primarily in the context of recapitalization efforts by these banks. Thus, RBS and UBS-two banks 
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Whether the reasons for this 'moral obligation' lies in Temasek's role as a foreign investor in all three banks, or whether it lies in the fact that as a sovereign wealth fund it is expected to share China's concern for the stability of financial markets more so than its private counterparts is unclear. In any event, this episode should have re-enforced the notion that foreign investors do indeed come in different types and that they behave accordingly. By ensuring that each bank had at least two strategic investors the risk associated with each one of them was mitigated.
IV. Bank Deals in the Global Crisis
Learning by inter-organizational monitoring is a strategy not limited to the aforementioned bank-deals in China. In fact, it is a strategy frequently employed under (Martin 2008) in the newly-formed Blackstone Holding. While the limited partnership structure
Blackstone chose for its reorganization did not grant voting rights to unit holders, an investor with such a large stake and-more importantly-additional available assets for future investments is likely to be heard by any management irrespective of formal voting rights.
The detailed features of the CIC-Blackstone deal are consistent in their similarities with those of the China-Bank deals discussed above. Future investments by CIC in Blackstone were restricted in the original agreement so that at no time would it own more than 10 percent equity in Blackstone Group Limited Partnership. 68 CIC committed not to sell its units for a period of four years save for the event of a change of control at Blackstone; in the event that CIC decided to sell at the end of the lockup period, it was agreed that they would not to sell more than one-third of its units in next three consecutive years. Finally, in one of the clearest indications that the quid pro quo of the transaction went beyond the exchange of units for money, CIC "agree(d) to explore in good faith potential arrangements pursuant to which it or its affiliates would invest in or commit fund amounts to current and future investment funds managed by [Blackstone] and to evaluate in good faith and consider investing in any comparable funds or vehicles offered by [Blackstone] in connection with any investment they make in alternative funds or vehicles." 69 The provision could be interpreted as a commitment device for Blackstone: Only if the deal turned out to be lucrative for CIC would they explore future business opportunities in 'good faith;' CIC lost heavily on this transaction and has been severely criticized in China for it, yet, because of the lockup provision, CIC is unable to 68 Note, however, that this limit was raised to 12 percent in the fall of 2008. Gillian Wee, "Blackstone agrees to raise limit on China fund stake", Bloomberg at www. In sum, just as in the cases of the China bank deals, the SWF transactions were structured to create commitments for the parties involved beyond the quid pro quo of a standard portfolio transaction. This does not mean that CIC, CDB, or Temasek were uninterested in harnessing returns on their investments, however, the financial loss may have been compensated at least in part by opportunities to learn about how their targets or co-investors operate. The fact that CIC chose its two primary investment targets to help this SWF to allocated its investments in US and global markets is a clear indicator that the investment in learning by monitoring has paid off for all parties.
IV. Concluding Comments
China has established an approach to banking or-more broadly-financial sector reform that differs markedly from those utilized in other emerging market economies. At the core of this approach has been the creation of equity ties between large Chinese banks and two or more strategic investors from different governance regimes. Instead of transferring control, these transactions enabled cooperation and inter-organizational learning. The approach for financial sector reform reflects a broader trend in China's economic reform strategy-one that emphasizes the continuous process of economic transformation and the need for the continuous adaptation and experimentation of institutional arrangements under conditions of uncertainty.
The transactions between Western banks and SWFs from China, Singapore and the Middle East which concluded during the global financial crisis bear striking November 2008, available at www.investorrelations.barclays.co.uk. For a detailed discussion of this transaction see also (Pistor 2009). similarities with those earlier transactions; just as in China's bank deals, investors acquired only minority stakes-not control rights. In most cases, more than one investor was involved and most agreed to lockup periods, or the transactions were structured so as to make an early exit difficult; an important motive for these deal structures was to stabilize ownership patterns as a means for reducing share price volatility on one hand, and the ability to learn from monitoring and cooperating with other parties. This deal structure marks a departure from patterns of foreign investments that assume superior expertise by one party and that uses control rights as a surety for transferring such expertise.
The global financial crisis has cut short some of these relations-most notably in the case of RBS and the BoC. It has also subjected the transactional models discussed to a stress test, which revealed that minority owners, and especially Western banks-even those holding a fairly large stake-might not be the stable owners they were expected to be; so long as the cost of exit is not prohibitively high, they will exit when it suits their needs. The best insurance against the downward pressure such an exit may exert on share prices and-by implication-on the stability of domestic banks has been the presence of another strategic investor willing and able to step into the void; in the examples discussed, SWFs have proven more reliable stabilizers than private investors; 79 this suggests that the identity of the owners may be as important as the structure of the deal-it remains to be seen whether SWFs' willingness to endure financial loss in the interim will 
